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THE QUESTION OF REASONABLENESS IN
MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC SCHOOL SEARCHES
"The FourthAmendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy.' That Amendment protects individualprivacy
against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go
further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all."'
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 26, 2000, a seventh grade middle school student shot and
killed his teacher with a gun the student brought to school.2 Violence and
drug use among teens in public schools is increasing at an alarming rate,
and public school officials are concerned for the safety of both their students and the entire school community.3 Due to recent incidents of school
violence, school officials need to act quickly to defuse potentially volatile
situations with students before they explode.4 Since the safety of the entire
school community is at risk, public school officials should not be required
to obtain a warrant before searching a student's locker for contraband. 5
Massachusetts courts have not explicitly addressed whether Article
14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights ("Art. 14") requires a higher
standard than the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
1 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
The Associated Press, Mounting Evidence, (May 29, 2000) available at

2

ABCNews.go.com:http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailNews/fla-shootingooo529.
html (reporting teacher shot by student in school).
3 HONORABLE JOSEPH A. GRASSO, JR. & HONORABLE CHRISTINE M. McEvoy,
SUPPRESSION MATTERS UNDER MASSACHUSETTS LAW.

§ 17

AT

273 (1999) (stating educating

students and not criminal investigation primary purpose of public school teachers).
4 See Commonwealth v. Snyder, 413 Mass. 521, 528, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (1992)
(acknowledging imminent threat of marijuana spreading through school if officials did not
search and seize it).
5 See infra, notes 48, 49 and accompanying text.
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("Fourth Amendment") for what constitutes reasonable suspicion for student searches in public schools. 6 The current ambiguity in Massachusetts'
law renders it difficult to determine what constitutes "reasonableness" for
searches7 conducted by school officials in the Massachusetts public school
system.
This note will attempt to determine the "reasonableness" standard
for public school locker searches under Art. 14. Part II will discuss the
history of public school searches and seizures under Federal Law.8 Part II
will also examine the Supreme Court's decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 9
since Massachusetts follows T.L.0. with respect to Fourth Amendment
searches and seizures in public schools.' In addition, Part II will discuss
the "probable cause" and "reasonable suspicion" standards under Federal
Law by comparing searches conducted by school officials in conjunction
with police with those conducted solely by school officials." Part III will
discuss the Massachusetts standard for search and seizure in public
schools, and the resulting question of whether Art. 14 requires a higher
level of reasonable suspicion then the level provided under T.L.O. and the
Fourth Amendment.' 2 Finally, in order to determine what the Massachusetts standard of "reasonableness" should be under Art. 14, Part IV will
analyze the Federal and Massachusetts standards for searches conducted
solely by school officials and3 those conducted by school officials in conjunction with police officers.'
II. HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Until forty years ago, searches and seizures in public schools were
not an issue of concern for lawmakers since teachers in public schools
disciplined students under the loco parentis doctrine. 14 This doctrine considered teachers as private individuals rather then governmental actors,
6

See infra, notes 111-112 and accompanying text.

7 See infra, note 113 and accompanying text.
8

See infra, notes 14-50 and accompanying text.

9469 U.S. 321 (1985).
1oSee infra, notes 51-75 and accompanying text.
" See infra, notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
12 See infra, notes 88-130, and accompanying text.
13See infra, notes 131-150, and accompanying text.
14See Jacqueline A. Stefkovich et. al. Law Enforcement Officers in Public Schools:

Student Citizens in Safe Havens?, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 25, 26-27 (1999) (stating loco
parentis means school teachers stand in place of parents in disciplining students).
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affording teachers the same rights to search a locker as parents had to
search their own child's closet. 15 Consequently, "by classifying school
searches as falling under the loco parentis theory, the courts were able to
side step the question of applicability of the Fourth Amendment. ' 16
For a defendant to invoke Fourth Amendment protection against an
unlawful search and seizure, the defendant must show that government
action existed, and the defendant had an expectation of privacy. 17 In 1985,
the Supreme Court marked the end of the loco parentis doctrine in T.LO,
holding public school teachers were state actors.18 Therefore, under
T.L.O., public school officials were subject to the Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures provision through
the Fourteenth Amendment. 19
T.L.O. established the standard of "reasonable suspicion" for public
school searches conducted by public school officials.2 0 The history of
public school searches conducted in conjunction with law enforcement
'
officials has yielded the different search standard of "probable cause."'
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, probable cause means that there is
reason to believe that a crime has been committed and that the evidence of
the crime will be found in the place to be searched. 2

'5 See M. Teressa Harris, New Jersey v. T.L0.: New Standard for Review or New
Label?, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 157, 163-64 (1985) (discussing under loco parantisteachers enjoy same rights and privileges in matters of discipline, and safety as parents).
16Stefkovich, supra note 14, at 27.

17Grasso & McEvoy supra, note 3, § 3.2, at 42. (stating U.S. Supreme Court con-

flated standing into expectation of privacy).
'8See T.L0., 469 U.S. at 334 (holding public school officials represent state and not
surrogates for parents).
19See id.; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960) (holding Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers); West Virginia
State Board of Ed. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (holding Fourteenth Amendment
protects citizens against state agencies including Board of Education).
20 See T.LO., 469 U.S. at 341.
21See id. at 341 n. 7.
22 See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (officer possessed requisite probable
cause to search defendant because officer made valid arrest); see also Commonwealth v.
Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 370, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985). "A substantial basis for concluding
that any of the articles described in the warrant are probably in the place to be searched."

Id.
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A. The FederalStandard
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and seizures;
rather, it prohibits unreasonablesearches.23 The Fourth Amendment, "the
right of people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by an oath or affirmation particularly describing the person or thing to be seized." 24
In the concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,25 Justice Harlen
set out a twofold requirement for ascertaining when government action
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. 26 First, "a person must
have exhibited an actual expectation of privacy, and second, the expecta-27
tion must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.,
Under Justice Harlen's twofold requirement, home searches fall under the
Fourth Amendment because people have an expectation of privacy in their
homes, and society recognizes that expectation as reasonable.2 8 Conversely, individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy for
"objects, activities or statements that [they expose] to the 'plain view' of
23See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating Fourth Amendment protects only those students in
public schools, not those in private school).

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
26Id at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). In Katz, the court found the petitioner guilty of

transmitting wagering information by telephone to several major cities in the United States.
Id. at 348. The FBI had attached an electronic listening device to a public pay phone used
by the petitioner. Id The Court reversed the conviction, holding that the petitioner had an
expectation to privacy and therefore the tapping of the public telephone constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment which requires a warrant. Id. at 353. The Court reasoned that
the Fourth Amendment does not protect an individual who knowingly exposes himself to
the public. Id at 351. The Court further reasoned that when a person intentionally seeks to
preserve privacy in an area accessible to the public that person may be protected under the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 351-52. The Court held that since the government agents did not
secure a warrant before the wire tapping, the government agents violated the petitioner's
rights under the Fourth Amendment. Katz 389 U.S.. at 359. See also e.g., California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (finding expectation of privacy with respect to garbage
unreasonable when placed in public area for pickup); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 123 (1984) (finding no expectation to privacy in determining whether a particular
substance constitutes illegal drugs); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-42 (1979)
(stating that individual has no expectation of privacy in numbers dialed on his or her telephone).
27 Katz, 399 U.S. at 361; see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999)
(stating when Fourth Amendment yields no answer for search and seizure courts must
balance reasonableness with governmental interests).
28 See Katz, 399 U.S. at 361.
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outsiders because no intention to keep them to [themselves] has been exhibited." 29
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that the level of governmental intrusion into privacy by means of a search must be reasonable. 3° Reasonableness is the "ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental
search.3' Generally, the reasonableness requirement prohibits the government from conducting a search without individualized suspicion, a warrant, or probable cause." 32 However government searches and seizures in
the absence of a warrant, probable cause or individualized suspicion may
be permissible under a "special needs" exception. 33 In such cases it is
"necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the
government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a
warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context."'
The special needs doctrine has its origins in T.L.O. where the Court
addressed the proper standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by public school officials.35 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Blackman stated, "only those exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute
its balancing interests for that of the framers. 36
The Court's decisions in both Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
Association37 and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab38 fur29

See id

30See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Furgeson v. The City of Charleston, South

Carolina, 186 F.3d 469, 476 (4th Cir. 1997).
31 See Vernonia School Dist 47J. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (addressing
drug testing in high schools under special needs doctrine).
32 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997) (holding search unreasonable
under special needs doctrine).
33See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989)
(determining whether special needs satisfied warrantless search).
34Id. at 656-66.
35T.LO, 469 U.S. at 341
36Id. at 351.
3'489 U.S. 602 (1989). In Skinner, the railway labor organizations filed suit to en-

join regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration governing drug and
alcohol testing of railroad employees. Id. at 608-09.
38 489 U.S. 656 (1989). At issue in Von Raab was whether the policy of requiring
urinalysis tests from all employee applicants for transfer or promotion by the United States
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ther developed the special needs doctrine. In Skinner, the Court held that
"[t]he government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety. . . 'like wise presents 'special needs' beyond the normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant
and probable cause requirements. ' 39 Additionally, the Von Raab Court
held the United States Customs Service conducted drug tests which were
compliant with the United States Constitution, applying a two step analysis
for the special needs doctrine: "Where the Fourth Amendment intrusion
serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations
against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to
require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context."''4
In its analysis under the special needs balancing test, the Court in
Von Raab found that imposing a warrant requirement for drug testing
Customs employees "would provide little or nothing in the way of additional protection of personal privacy."4 1 Ultimately, the Von Raab court
held that the government's "compelling interest in safeguarding our borders and the public safety outweigh the privacy expectation of employees
who seek to be promoted to positions that directly involve the
interdiction
42
firearm.
a
carry
to
incumbent
the
require
that
of illegal drugs
The Court in Vernonia concluded that special needs exist in the
public school context where obtaining a warrant is impractical.4 3 The
Customs Services was constitutional. Id. at 660-62.
39 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. at 873-74
(1987)).
40 Von Raab 489 U.S. at 665-66.
41Id. at

667.

Id. at 677 (holding compelling government interests justified urine screening in
absence of probable cause or any individualized suspicion of drug use). The Court also
examined the public interest component of the balancing test and noted that the smuggling
of narcotics has become a national crisis. Id. at 668. Further, the Court noted that United
States Customs officers are the country's "first line of defense of one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of the population." Id. at 668. The Court balanced the
public interest in addressing the drug problem against the Customs employee's expectation
to privacy and held that the customs employees have a "diminished expectation to privacy"
with respect to urine testing. Id. at 672.
43515 U.S. 646 (1995) (holding student privacy interests diminished because students voluntarily participated in the athletic programs). In Vernonia, school officials noticed a steady increase in drug use among high school students and determined that the
athletes were the leaders of the drug culture. Id. at 648-49. As a result, the school district
adopted a Student Athlete Drug Policy that authorized random drug testing of students who
participated in school athletic programs. Id. at 649-51. The purpose of the policy was "to
42
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Court held that a school policy which subjects student athletes to random
drug tests was reasonable because it found clear evidence that drugs in
public schools is a crisis, and that deterring student drug use is an important governmental concern. 44 Finally, in Chandler, the Court held that
while a valid search must be based on "individualized suspicion of wrong
doing," suspicionless drug testing, not accompanied by individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, can also comport with the Fourth Amendment.45
However, unlike Vernonia, Von Raab, and Skinner where evidence existed
of a "concrete danger," the search in Chandler provided no evidence of a
"concrete danger." 46 The Court in Chandler held that the search did not
fall under the special needs doctrine and thus violated the Fourth Amendment because a "concrete danger" must exist to justify a warrantless search
and seizure.
The government interest in student safety is likely to be jeopardized
when a warrant or probable cause is required in certain situations; namely,
searching school lockers. 48 The Supreme Court has recognized the legality
of searches and seizures in special needs cases where reasonable suspicions exist, but have not amounted to probable cause.49 When considering
special needs, courts consider three factors: (1) whether the search required a warrant; (2) whether the search is conducted on a lower standard
than probable cause such as reasonable suspicion; and (3) whether the reasonable suspicion is individualized.5 °

prevent student athletes from using drugs, to protect their health and safety, and to provide
drug users with assistance programs." Id. at 650.
44 See id. at 664-65.
45 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318. At issue in Chandler was a statute which required
all

candidates for certain state offices to be tested for illegal drug use through a urinalysis. Id.
at 309.
46

See id. at 321-22.

47

Id.

48

See Grasso & McEvoy supra, n. 3 § 17-1, at 273; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (requir-

ing teacher to obtain warrant before searching student interferes with informal disciplinary
procedures in public schools), Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 651 (affirming prior T.LO. holding
requiring neither warrant nor probable cause to search student in the public school context).
49 See T.LO., 469 U.S. at 339. See e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968)
(holding pat down of outer clothing to discover weapons used in assault reasonable when
suspect threatens personal safety of police officer); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 442
U.S. 873, 871 (1975) (holding officer who reasonably suspects vehicle contains illegal alien
attempting to enter country may stop the car); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55
(1979) (holding minimum threshold of reasonable suspicion).
50 See Grasso & McEvoy supra n. 3 § 17-1, at 274.
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B. New Jersey v. T.L. 0.: The Reasonable Suspicion Standard

1. Facts
In T.L.O., a public school teacher discovered the defendant and the
defendant's friend smoking cigarettes in the school bathroom in violation
of school policy. 5' The teacher escorted the two students to the assistant
vice principal's office where the assistant vice principal asked the defendant if she had been smoking. 52 After the defendant denied smoking and
claimed she was53a non-smoker, the assistant vice principal demanded to
search her purse.
Upon opening the defendant's purse, the assistant vice principal
found not only cigarettes, but also cigarette rolling paper, which is commonly used in conjunction with marijuana. 54 In addition to the papers, the
assistant vice principal subsequently found marijuana, a pipe, a substantial
amount of money, plastic bags, two note cards listing names of students
that owed her money, and two letters implicating her as a marijuana
dealer. After the search, the assistant principal then notified the police
and the defendant's mother.5 6 At the police station, the defendant admitted
to selling marijuana in school,
and as a result, the state brought delin57
quency charges against her.
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence confiscated
in the search, arguing the search violated her Fourth Amendment rights.58
The defendant also moved to suppress her confession, claiming it was the
product of an unlawful search. 59 The juvenile court denied the defendant's
motion to suppress and sentenced her to one year of probation. 60 On appeal, the Appeals Court affirmed the juvenile court's finding that the
search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 61 However, the ApSI

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325.

52

Id.

53

Id.

4Id.

55 Id.
56

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.

57 Id.
58 Id. at 329.
59

Id.
60 T.LO., 469
61

Id. at 330.

U.S. at 330
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peals Court vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded the case
for a determination of whether the defendant had "voluntarily
and know62
ingly waived her Fifth Amendment rights before confessing.,
The defendant appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court which
reversed the lower courts' holdings that the search of her purse was reasonable, and instead found that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches
conducted by public school officials.63
The Supreme Court granted the state's petition for certiorari.64 The
Supreme Court ordered re-argument of the case to decide the broader
question of what limits the Fourth Amendment places on the activities of
school authorities. 65 The Supreme Court ultimately held the search did not
violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment right to a warrant or probable
cause because it fell within the "special needs" exception. 66
2. The T.LO. Standard
The Court held that held that school officials in T.L.O. possessed
reasonable suspicion to search the defendant's purse and therefore did not
violate her Fourth Amendment rights. 67 The Court used a twofold inquiry
in determining "reasonableness., 68 First, "whether the action was justified
at its inception," and second whether the search was "reasonably justified
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place." 69 The Court ruled that the search of a public school student is
"justified at its inception" if it is based on the reasonable suspicion that the
evidence70 will show the student's action violated of either school rules or
the law.
62 id
631d

64
65

d at 331.
T.LO., 469 U.S. at 332.

66 See id at
67

330

See id at 341. "The legality of the search of a student should depend simply on

the reasonableness, under all circumstances of the search." Id.
68 Id (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (deciding reasonableness of exterior pat down by officer searching suspect in relationship to suspect's safety)).
69 Id. (stating two fold inquiry in determining reasonabiness).
70

See T.LO., 469 U.S. at 341-42. "Such a search will be permissible in its scope

when the measure adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." id at 342.
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Furthermore, the Court stated that the reasonable suspicion standard affords public school students fewer protections than the probable
cause standard.7' It balanced the rights of the students against the safety of
the public school officials and the need for quick and appropriate administration of discipline.7 2 The Court held that such a "standard will neither
unduly burden the efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their
schools nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of school
children." 7 The Court reasoned that under the reasonable suspicion standard, the invasion of students' interests would not exceed that which is
necessary to achieve safety and order in public schools. 74 Thus, T.LO.
sets the standard for searches conducted by school officials merely at reasonable suspicion.75
C. Searches by Public School Officials in Conjunction with Law
Enforcement
Although T.LO. set forth the reasonable suspicion standard for
searches in public school by school officials, it did not address the standard for searches conducted in conjunction with law enforcement
officers.76 In Picha v. Wieglos,77 a District Court case decided prior to
T.L.O. the court examined the issue of police working in conjunction with
school officials and concluded that when police are involved before the
search, and are significantly part of it, the search must pass muster under a
probable cause standard.78
71See id. at 339. (stating warrant requirement of Fourth Amendment unsuitable for

public school environment).
72

See T.L0., 469 U.S. at 341. "The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited

to the school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child
suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere
with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the
schools." Id
73Id. at 342-343.
74See id.
75See id.
76See

T.LO., 469 U.S. at 342 n.7 (noting probable cause standard for searches con-

ducted by public school officials in conjunction with police officers).
77410F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. I. 1976).
78 See Picha, 410 F. Supp. at 1219-1221. In Picha, the defendant school principal
received a phone call that led him to believe the plaintiff and two of her friends possessed
illegal drugs. id. at 1216. The defendant was advised to call the police and when the to
police arrived, the three girls were searched by the school nurse and psychologist. ld The
searchers found no drugs. d.The plaintiff subsequently brought suit on the basis that the
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In Cason v. Cook,7 9 the circuit court noted that although the principal was accompanied by a law enforcement official during a search, the
search was not at the behest of the law enforcement official. 8° Since police
involvement in the search was minimal, the court subjected the search to
the T.L. 0. standard rather than the higher probable cause standard. 8'
In Tarter v. Raybuck, 82 the court found the police involvement in a
search to be marginal where school officials summoned the police officers
to the scene in order to remove students, but not to aid the teachers in the
search.83 The circuit court noted that the officers' "presence does not84suggest that a standard other than reasonable cause ought to be adopted."
The Federal Court standard for searches by public school officials
in conjunction with law enforcement officials is unclear. The Supreme
Court chose not to address the issue in T.L. 0., but acknowledged Picha as
the rule, holding probable cause as the standard applicable to searches involving the police. 85 However, the Picha standard is clearly not applicable
where law enforcement officers are not substantially involved in the
incident violated her civil rights. Id.
'9810 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1987).
80See Cook, 810 F.2d at 190. Plaintiff student approached defendant vice principal,
Cook, and reported that her locker had been broken into and several items were missing. Id.
at 189. Several other students claimed that their lockers were broken into. Id. An undercover police officer assigned to the high school stood with the defendant while students
made reports. kd at 190. The defendant and police officer investigated the alleged thefts by
interviewing several students. Id. The investigation revealed the plaintiff was spotted in the
locker room at about the time of the alleged thefts. Id. at 190. The defendant vice principal
searched the plaintiffs purse and one of the reported items was in the plaintiffs purse.
Cook, 810 F.2d at 190. Subsequently, the police officer conducted a pat down search of the
plaintiff. Id. After the search of the purse, and the pat down, the defendant principal
searched the student's locker. Id. When the locker search was completed, the principal took
the students to his office for questioning. Id. The undercover police officer did not participate in either the search of the locker of the questioning of the students. Id.

" See Cook, 810 F.2d at 192 (holding search to probable cause standard even though
police involved).
82 742 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1984).
83 See

id at 983. In Tarter,school officials were investigating the possibility of drug

use and drug sales on school grounds. Id. at 979. The school official questioned several
students with no results and proceeded to summon the police and have the students removed. Id. at 979, 983. When the plaintiff refused to answer questions and further refused
to remove his pants for a search, the school officials requested to assistance of the police.
Id. at 983.
84Id. at 983 (holding reasonable suspicion standard when police do not participate in
search).
85 Compare, Picha, 410 F. Supp. at 1219-1221 (standard) with T.LO., 469 U.S. at
342-343 (standard).
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search.86
III. THE MASSACHUSETTS STANDARD FOR SEARCH AND
SEIZURE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
To invoke the protection of Art. 14, a defendant must show that the
"search and seizure involved government action, that he was present or
had a substantial possessory interest in the place searched or the item
seized, and that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place
searched." 87 The language of the Art. 14 is very similar to the text of the
Fourth Amendment, whereas they both provide protection for unreasonable searches and seizures. 88
A. The Fourth Amendment Standardin Massachusetts:Commonwealth v.
Carey
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (SJC) considered the
same issue in Commonwealth v. Carey 89 as the Supreme Court did in
T.L.O.90 In Carey, the court observed that although T.L.O. addressed the
standard for searches in public school, it did not specifically address the
86 See Tarter,742 F.2d at 983.
87 Grasso & McEvoy supra, note 3, § 3-2, at 42 (stating expectation to privacy,
standing, governmental interest necessary to invoke art. 14 Declaration of Rights argument). See MASS CONST. of 1780, art. XI. "Every subject has a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his house, his papers, and all of his
possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if cause or foundation of
them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a
civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons,
or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or
objects of search, arrest, or seizure: and no warrant out to be issued but in cases, and with
formalities proscribed by the laws" Id.
88 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; MASS CONST. of 1780. XIV.

89 407 Mass. 528, 534 N.E.2d 1199 (1990).
90 See id at 531, 554 N.E.2d at 1201. In Carey, the defendant was a senior at Woburn High School who reportedly brought a gun to school in response to an altercation that
occurred the previous week. See id. at 529, 554 N.E.2d. at 1200. Two students reported to
their industrial shop teacher that the defendant had shown them the gun See id. The teacher
quickly conveyed the information to the assistant principle who told the principal and house
master. See id. The three administrators decided to seek out the defendant, and if no evidence of a gun was found, to search his locker. See id. at 530, 554 N.E.2d at 1201. Due to
the gravity of the situation, the administrators contacted the police. See Carey, 407 Mass. at
530, 554 N.E.2d at 1201. After a brief period of questioning, the school official searched
the defendant's locker and found a 22-caliber pistol in his locker. See id.
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issue of a student's expectation of privacy in locker searches. 91 The SJC
decided Carey solely on Fourth Amendment grounds, holding that any
with respect to a locker search
expectation of privacy a student might have
92
by school administrators is unreasonable.
In reaching its holding, the SJC stated public school officials are
93
governmental actors whose conduct falls within the Fourth Amendment.
The court noted the Fourth Amendment also protects persons from governmental intrusions only to the extent there is a legitimate expectation of
privacy. 94 Therefore, according to the SJC, the defendant had no expectation of privacy in that case, and the search of his locker was reasonable
both at its inception and in scope.95
B. The Article 14 Standard:Commonwealth v. Snyder
The SJC decided Carey based solely on T.L.O., and the Fourth
Amendment. 96 Two years later in Snyder,97 the SJC was confronted with
as the Fourth Amendment for
whether Art. 14 imposed the same standard
98
searches and seizures in public schools.
91 See id. (stating student shares joint custody of locker with school administrators).
The Court in TLO. found the standard for searches conducted by school officials to be
reasonable suspicion. See T.L 0., 489 U.S. at 342-343.
92 See Carey, 407 Mass. at 531, 554 N.E.2d. at 1202 (stating students share joint
custody of locker with school administration who has right to access); see also Commonwealth v. Morrison, 429 Mass. 511, 513-514, 710 N.E.2d. 584, 586-587 (1999) (holding
under certain circumstances society unwilling to accept expectation to privacy as reasonable); but see Commonwealth v. Snyder, 413 Mass. 521, 526, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1365
(1992) (holding students have reasonable expectation to privacy in locker); but see Grasso
& McEvoy supra, note 3 §17-2(b), at 276. "Barring some express understanding to the
contrary, students have a reasonable and protected expectation to privacy in their school
lockers." Id.
93 See Carey, 407 Mass. at 531, 554 N.E.2d. at 1201. To test whether a person had
expectation to privacy is first to determine whether the person had a subjective expectation
to privacy, and second "whether society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable." See id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Panetti, 406 Mass. 230, 231, 547 N.E.2d 46, 47
(1989)).
94 See Carey, 407 Mass. at 531, 554 N.E.2d at 1202.
95 See id. at 536, 554 N.E.2d at 1204. The Carey court used the T.LO. test to determine the constitutionality of the search conducted by the school officials. See id.
96 See id.
97 413 Mass. 521, 597 N.E.2d 1363 (1992).
98 See id. at 528, 597 N.E.2d at 1367 (identifying search and seizure under art. 14 as
primary issue in case).
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In Snyder, a faculty member told the school's principal and vice
principal that he was approached by a student who reported that the defendant had attempted to sell her marijuana. 99 The faculty member also told
the administrators that the student disclosed to him that the defendant was
hiding the marijuana in a videocassette holder in his bag.'0° The school
administrators left the office and found the defendant in the student center
but did not see his book bag. 01' Realizing the student center was too
crowded, the school officials elected to wait until the defendant was in
class and then proceeded to search his locker. 102 Once the defendant was
the book
in class, the public school officials searched his locker and found
03
bag, the videocassette container, and three bags of marijuana.'
Upon discovering the marijuana, the principal summoned the defendant to his office where he admitted that the book bag, videocassette
container, and marijuana belonged to him.1°4 The principal notified the
student's mother and the police, who subsequently arrested and questioned
the defendant. 0 5
The defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and the Pittsfield Superior Court found the defendant guilty of illegal possession, and possession with intent to distribute a class "D" substance. °6 The trial judge
stayed7 the execution of the sentence pending the defendant's appeal to the
10

sJc.

The SJC in Snyder affirmed the lower court, holding the school
principal had probable cause to search the student's locker, and was not
required to give the student his Miranda warnings prior to questioning. 108
Unlike Carey, the Snyder considered the constitutionality of search and
seizure by school officials under Art. 14 as opposed to the Fourth
Amendment. 1 9 In deciding whether the search was constitutionally rea99 Id. at 523, 597 N.E.2d at 1364.

1ooId.
101Id.
102 Snyder, 413

Mass. at 523-524, 597 N.E.2d at 1365-66.

103Id.
104 Id. The defendant also admitted there had been four bags of marijuana, not three,
and he had sold one of them for twenty-five dollars. Id.
105 Id. At the police station, the defendant signed a rights waiver and gave a written

statement. Id. The defendant also admitted he had an accomplice who was tried, convicted,
and sentenced. Id.
106 See id.
107Id. at 525, 597 N.E.2d at 1365-66.
108 See id.
109

at 528, 531, 597 N.E.2d at 1368, 1369.

See Snyder, 413 Mass. at 529, N.E.2d at 1368. The court in Carey held the stu-
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sonable, the SJC determined that Art. 14 imposed no higher standard than
probable cause." ° However, the SJC did not explicitly decide whether
Art. 14 requires a more strict standard of "reasonableness" than the Fourth
Amendment. "'
In arriving at its holding, the SJC in Snyder first addressed the issue
of the defendant's expectation of privacy. 12 The SJC found that the student handbook stated, "each student has the right not to have his locker
subjected to unreasonable searches." '" 3 Consequently, the Court found4
that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his locker.' '
Since the defendant had an expectation of privacy, the SJC considered
whether the search by the state actor (the teacher) infringed on his reasonable expectations." 5
The holding in Snyder was in accord with the Supreme Court ruling
that no search warrant is required for school searches conducted by public
school officials. 16 The SJC held that "there may be a question as to a particular search, whether a school employee had a constitutionally adequate
basis to conduct the search and there may be a question about the scope of
the search, but the absence of a search warrant will not be a disputable
factor."" 7

In its reasoning, the SJC stated that in most instances a public
school official needs to act swiftly, and the imminence of marijuana being
distributed through out the school is enough for the faculty member to
conduct a warrantless search." 8 However, the SJC noted that when a pubdent had no expectation to privacy and the search of his locker was reasonable both at
inception and in scope. Id.
110See id. (holding school officials had probable cause when searching defendant's
locker); Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass 363, 370, 476 N.E.2d 548, 554 (1985) (stating
"cause" in art 14 Declaration of Rights means "probable cause"). But see Commonwealth
v. Hor, 1999 WL 674443 (Mass.Super. 1999) (stating not settled explicitly whether art 14
of Declaration of Rights imposes stricter standard of reasonableness).
"'. See Hor,

1999 WL 674443; Snyder, 413 Mass at 529, 597 N.E. 2d at 1367.

112 See Snyder, 413 Mass. 526, 597 N.E.2d at 1366.
113 Id.
114 See id. The court in Carey stated public school students do not have an expectation of privacy to their lockers because the lockers are considered community property and
because the public school officials have access to the lockers. See Carey, 407 Mass. at 531,
554 N.E.2d, at 1202.
115 See Snyder, 413 Mass. at 526-527, 597 N.E.2d at 1367.
116 See id. at 528, 597 N.E.2d at 1367.

117

id.
118 See id at 528 n.7, 597 N.E.2d 1366 at 1368 n.7.
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lic school official is acting as an agent of the police, a warrant is required
to conduct a search and seizure of the contraband."19
C. The Aftermath of the Carey and Snyder Decisions
Both Carey and Snyder address the issue of searches and seizures
in the Massachusetts elementary and secondary schools, and both hold that
public school teachers are state actors.2z The SJC in Commonwealth v.
Neilson 2 ' held that when State campus police entered an individual's
dorm room without a warrant, they did so in violation of the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights.122 Neilson demonstrates the SJC's reluctance
to extend the reasonable suspicion standard past public secondary and
elementary schools. 23 "In college searches, where police are involved and
the evidence obtained is to be used in a criminal proceeding, courts generally require probable 24cause and a warrant absent express consent or exigent circumstances." 1
The law regarding police involvement in student searches is distinct in some respects. If the circumstances dictate a situation of urgency,
then it is clear that exigent circumstances, as an exception to the probable
cause standard, will allow the police officer to conduct a search. 125 If a
school employee acts explicitly under the guidance of a law enforcement
officer, then it is likely that the probable cause standard applies to the stu-

"19 See

id. at 528, 597 N.E.2d 1366.

120See

Grasso & McEvoy, supra, note 3 § 17-2(b), at 276.

12 423 Mass. 75, 666 N.E.2d. 984 (1996) (holding Fourth Amendment violation oc-

curred when campus police conducted warrantless search of defendant's dorm room). At
the time of his arrest, the defendant in Neilson was a student at Fitchburg State College. See
id. at 76, 666 N.E.2d. at 985.
122 See id. at 80, 666 N.E.2d at 984. Like any other student, the defendant signed a
residence contract which stated "[riesidence life staff members will enter student rooms to
inspect for hazards to health or personal safety." Id. It was suspected that the defendant
had a cat in his room and a notice was posted alerting the students that there would be a
door to door check for any school violations. Id. While searching the defendant's room,
who was not present at the time, the officials noticed a light glowing form the closet. Id
The official opened the closet door and found two large marijuana plants sitting in the
closet and subsequently notified the campus police. See Neilson, 423 Mass. at 76, 666
N.E.2d. at 985.
123See Grasso & McEvoy, supra, note 3 § 17-2(b), at 276-277.
124 Neilson, 423 Mass. at 78, 666 N.E.2d at 985.
125 See

Carey, 407 Mass. at 534, 554 N.E.2d at 1202 (stating exigent circumstances

support probable cause standard).
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dent search conducted by the school official. 126 Yet, in the context of a
search conducted in a college dormitory by law enforcement officials, the
courts will also apply a probable cause standard. 27 The court's unwillingness to apply a reasonable suspicion 2 standard
to colleges demonstrates the
8
outer limits to which T.L.O. applies.
IV. POLICY
It has become increasingly important for school officials to act
quickly and decisively in searching and seizing contraband. 29 As a result,
Courts must balance the privacy interest afforded to public school students, either by the Fourth Amendment or Art. 14, with the need to maintain order and discipline in public schools. 130 Therefore, Massachusetts
should explicitly adopt the reasonable suspicion standard set forth in
T.L.O. because it will allow school officials to act quickly and without 3 a
warrant while affording students protection from unreasonable searches. ' '
The SJC's unwillingness to establish the Art. 14 standard with regard to public school searches leaves the law unsettled as to whether Art.
14 imposes a stricter standard than the Fourth Amendment.' 3 2 If Art. 14
creates a lower standard of reasonable suspicion so that the school administrator needs less cause to conduct the search then the Federal Standard
set forth in T.L.O., the student may become subject to an unreasonable
search. 133 Alternatively, if Art. 14 creates a higher standard, making it
more difficult for the school administrator to conduct a search, then the
governmental interest of safety for the students and school community at

126

See Snyder, 413 Mass. at 528, 597 N.E.2d at 1367 (holding search for drugs or

guns by school official acting explicitly for police requires probable cause standard).
127 See Neilson, 423 Mass. at 77-78, 666 N.E.2d at 986.
128 See id. (holding when evidence obtained by police without probable cause violates Fourth Amendment).
129 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (stating imminent threat of marijuana
spreading on school grounds poses danger to students).
130 See supra notes 68-70, 112, 114 and accompanying text (discussing balancing
expectation rights of students with governmental interest for safety).
131 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (stating students protected from un-

reasonable search and seizure under reasonable suspicion standard).
132 See supra note 110 and accompanying text (stating not settled explicitly whether
art 14 of Declaration of Rights imposes stricter standard of reasonableness).
133 See supra notes 68-70, 112, 114 and accompanying text (discussing balance of
expectation rights of students with governmental interest for safety).
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large may be placed in jeopardy. 134 Thus, the best resolution is for Art. 14
to be in explicit
accord with the T.L.0. standard with respect to student
35
searches. 1
It is also unclear whether a public school student in Massachusetts
has an expectation of privacy in his or her locker or book bag. 136 Since the
expectation of privacy is a necessary component to arguing that either an
individual's Art. 14 or Fourth Amendment Rights have been violated, the
courts should determine what expectation to privacy a student possesses in
public schools. 37 A public school student subjected to a locker search
conducted by school officials will always be able to argue that the search
was unreasonable under Art. 14 of Rights since the SJC has not explicitly
determined the Art. 14 standard. 138 As such, the expectation of privacy for
a student in Massachusetts should be in explicit accord with Snyder, rather
then Carey, since Snyder affords students protection from unreasonable
searches. 39
The policy behind school officials conducting school searches requires a definitive test, since courts appear reluctant to review the matter in
full. 14 It is well settled under both Massachusetts and Federal law, that
when a school official conducts a search solely at the behest of law enforcement officers, the probable cause standard applies. 141 When a law
enforcement officer is simply on the margin of the search conducted by the
142
public school official, the T.L.O. reasonable suspicion standard applies.
There are also situations where school officials conduct searches based on
information or exigent circumstances in conjunction with the law en134 See supra notes 68-70, 112, 114 and accompanying text (discussing balance of

expectation rights of students with governmental interest for safety).
135 See supra notes 68-70, 112, 114 and accompanying text (discussing balance of
expectation rights of students with governmental interest for safety).
136See supra note 92 and accompanying text (contrasting holdings of Snyder and
Carey).
137See supra note 91 and accompanying text (stating reasonable standard
for public
schools under Fourth Amendment).
138 See supra note 92 and accompanying text (showing conflict of holdings between
Snyder and Carry).
139 See supra note 91, 94 and accompanying text (drawing comparison between ex-

pectation to privacy with no expectation to privacy in public school).
140 See supra note 72, 76, 77, 81,124, 125 and accompanying text (stating police involvement usually requires probable cause standard for search).
141See supra note 72, 76, 77, 81, 124, 125 and accompanying text (stating police
involvement usually requires probable cause standard for search).
142 See supra note 81, 124 and accompanying text (stating marginal police involvement renders search standard of reasonable suspicion).
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forcement officers who are neither directly involved nor on the margin.' 43
The Supreme Court was reluctant to directly address the issue of searches
conducted in conjunction with law enforcement officers in T.L.O.' 44 This
suggests that courts are unsettled as to the standard for searches conducted
in conjunction with law enforcement officials where the law enforcement
officer's presence and involvement is neither direct nor on the margin. 145
With the reality that students are bringing drugs and weapons into
public schools, the Massachusetts courts should adopt the reasonable suspicion standard for all school searches conducted by public school officials
in conjunction with law enforcement officers.146 This standard protects
students from unreasonable searches, and allows law enforcement officers
police officers to protect both the stusuch as security guards and school
147
dents and the school community.
V. CONCLUSION
Federal law clearly provides that school officials acting alone must
have reasonable suspicion before searching a student's locker or book bag.
The standard regarding school searches conducted in concert with law
enforcement is also clear in several areas. For instance, if a police officer
is merely a marginal bystander to the search, then the search is subjected to
review under a reasonable suspicion standard. On the other hand, if school
officials conducting a search are acting as agents for the police, or the police initiate the search, then the probable cause standard applies. However,
it is unclear which of the two standards apply when a police officer is present but neither marginal to the search nor directly involved in the search.
Massachusetts law has followed the Supreme Court decision in
T.L.O. with respect to unassisted searches by school officials in elementary
and secondary schools. However Massachusetts' courts have not explicitly determined whether Art. 14 imposes a higher standard of reasonableness then the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, until the SJC provides the
143 See supra note 11l, and accompanying text (stating school officials had probable

clause when searching defendant's locker).
144 See supra note 77-78 and accompanying text (stating police involvement usually
requires standard of probable cause).
145 See supra note 77-78 and accompanying text (stating police involvement usually
requires standard of probable cause).
146 See supra notes 68-70, 112, 114 and accompanying text (discussing balancing
expectation rights of students with governmental interest for safety).
147 See supra note 68-70, and accompanying text (stating students protected from unreasonable search and seizure under reasonable suspicion standard).
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law consistently in the case of school searches, the troublesome ambiguity
will continue.
Kevin V. Maltby

